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EQUIVALENCES FOR TRUTH PREDICATES
CARLO NICOLAI
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich
Abstract. One way to study and understand the notion of truth is to examine principles that
we are willing to associate with truth, often because they conform to a pre-theoretical or to a semi-
formal characterization of this concept. In comparing different collections of such principles, one
requires formally precise notions of inter-theoretic reduction that are also adequate to compare these
conceptual aspects. In this work I study possible ways to make precise the relation of conceptual
equivalence between notions of truth associated with collections of principles of truth. In doing so,
I will consider refinements and strengthenings of the notion of relative truth-definability proposed
by Fujimoto (2010): in particular I employ suitable variants of notions of equivalence of theories
considered in Visser (2006) and Friedman & Visser (2014) to show that there are better candidates
than mutual truth-definability for the role of sufficient condition for conceptual equivalence between
the semantic notions associated with the theories. In the concluding part of the paper, I extend the
techniques introduced in the first and show that there is a precise sense in which ramified truth (either
disquotational or compositional) does not correspond to iterations of comprehension.
§1. The project. Comparing theories is one of the fundamental activities of the sci-
entist and of the philosopher. Often this comparison is carried out via formalization, and
there is a great deal of controversy on how to properly formalize scientific or mathematical
theories.1 In this work I focus on a narrower target and investigate notions of reduction and
equivalence involving deductive systems obtained by extending a base arithmetical theory
with principles of truth. This description is deliberately vague at this stage: I will in fact
relate either two theories of truth or a theory of truth and an extension of the base theory
with suitable comprehension schemata. In the rest of this introduction, I will motivate the
project in its twofold nature.
1.1. Truth and conceptual equivalence. Recent works on truth and semantic para-
doxes fall in two broad categories. On one side we find works that aim at describing a class
of models for languages endowed with a truth predicate. These construction are carried
out by defining the notion of truth in a more powerful metatheory—usually a system of
analysis in the case of an arithmetical base theory. We call this approach the semantic
approach (for an overview, see Field (2008)). On the other side authors that give priority to
rules and principles characterizing a primitive notion of truth. On this approach one focuses
on formal systems that generate truths (and falsities). The latter approach is widely known
as the axiomatic approach (Halbach, 2014; Horsten, 2011).
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1 See Lutz (2016) for an up to date account of the debate in the context of philosophy of science.
c© Association for Symbolic Logic, 2017
322 doi:10.1017/S1755020316000435
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020316000435
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. King's College London, on 26 Jul 2019 at 08:47:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
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That there can be fruitful interactions between the two modus operandi is clear since
Tarski’s seminal work.2 Collections of principles and rules usually form succinct and
accessible bases for motivating, evaluating, criticizing some approaches to semantic para-
doxes. Semantic constructions are often indispensable in the creative act of articulating one
such approach.3
In order to characterize the notion of truth arising from a semantic construction, one
usually fixes a specific model—e.g., the minimal fixed point of Kripke’s theory in Strong
Kleene logic from Kripke (1975)—and reads off the properties of the truth predicate in this
model. If one, by contrast, gives priority to the analysis of systems generating truths, the
vicinity to a semantic construction may be part of the characterization of the system’s truth
predicate, but also other features of this truth predicate need to be part of the analysis. For
instance, the vicinity of a system of truth T to a class of models  may be evaluated, as
proposed by Fischer, Halbach, Kriener, & Stern (2015), by considering ω-models. On this
approach, T will capture  if and only if4
(N, S)  T ⇔ (N, S) belongs to , (1)
where S is the extension of the truth predicate.
However, given some S, , there are several examples of systems T1, T2 satisfying (1)
that cannot be plausibly associated to the same notion of truth.5 This suggests that, in order
to characterize the notion of truth associated with a system of truth, we need to integrate
the vicinity to a semantic construction—that may still not necessarily be identified with the
criterion of sameness of ω-models of (Fischer et al., 2015)—with further, complementary
criteria. A list of such criteria for systems of truth will be provided in §2.
Before sketching the project any further, a note on terminology. We will employ inter-
changeably the expressions ‘notion of truth’, ‘concept of truth, and ‘conception of truth’
in relation to the outcome of the reflection on the properties of a truth predicate as
2 Cf. Fischer et al. (2015) and Halbach (2014) for an in-depth treatment of the relationships between
the two approaches.
3 A Kantian aphorism by Hannes Leitgeb may help in depicting the situation: it is often the case
that axiomatic truth without semantic truth is empty, whereas semantic truth without axiomatic
truth is blind.
4 For simplicity, we consider theories in classical logic, so  is the classical satisfaction relation.
5 For instance, let us consider the theories extending a base syntax theory B—that can be taken to
be a weak arithmetical system such as EA considered below—with typed Tarski biconditionals of
the form
‘ϕ’ is true if and only if ϕ
with ϕ a sentence of LB, and the theory obtained by extending B with full, compositional axioms
of the form
for all sentences ϕ, ψ of LB, the sentence ‘ϕ and ψ’ is true if and only if ‘ϕ’ is
true and ‘ψ’ is true.
The two theories are different in many respects: the latter theory is capable of proving many more
general claims than the first, it is compositional and not disquotational as the former, and its notion
of truth is not reducible to the logical resources of B. Moreover, the compositional theory will not
in general be relatively interpretable in B, for finitely axiomatizable B, and not conservative over
it if the right amount of inductive reasoning with truth is available. Nonetheless, the two truth
theories have the same models based on N—that is a pair (N, S) where S is the unique set of
truths for L—so they capture the same semantic construction according to the criterion above
and, if the ‘reductionist’ picture is endorsed, their notions of truth coincide.
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depicted by a theory of truth. In all cases we intend a cluster of conditions satisfied by
the truth predicates of the languages of our theories. In this sense a notion (conception,
concept) of truth is primarily not a psychological notion, and so my focus diverges from
the classical ontological and scientific questions on concepts that may be found in the
literature.6
At the informal level, we want to address the question: when the concepts of truth can be
considered equivalent? Still intuitively, our guiding answer is: when they equally possess or
lack a number of crucial properties. This characterization is of course still unsatisfactory.
In the first place we need the additional assumption that conceptions of truth are given
by formal theories, and formal systems in particular. Moreover, the relevant properties
that two theories of truth may or may not possess are dependent on one’s stance on
truth: an instrumentalist may regard provability of truth-free consequences as the only
criterion for equivalence of two truth predicates, whereas someone who is interested in the
purely truth theoretic principles of the theories may completely disregard their consistency
strength. In addition, one would like to integrate the mutual preservation of some features
of theories of truth qua mathematical objects into a more general framework of equivalence
of formal systems. It would be at least puzzling to realize that systems T1 and T2 are
formally equivalent in a strong sense but their truth predicates fare differently with respect
to some of the characterizing, quasi-formal desiderata generally imposed on notions of
truth.
In the first part of this work I will therefore investigate the possibility of finding a formal
counterpart to the informal relation of ‘conceptual equivalence’ just sketched. This is
not an easy nor an original task: some authors, notably (Fujimoto, 2010) and (Halbach,
2014), have tried to come up with notions of reductions up to the task. In particular,
by applying the notion of relative truth-definability—that is a relative interpretation that
keeps the syntactic vocabulary unchanged—and variations thereof, they aimed at capturing
the notion of conceptual equivalence of truth predicates (see §1 of Fujimoto (2010)), or
comparing the conceptual strength of two (or more) truth predicates. In the first part of
this paper I will show that the notions of (proof-theoretic reductions) that are commonly
employed in the literature, including relative truth-definability, do not suffice to adequately
characterize the relation of ‘conceptual equivalence of truth predicates’. In the second part
I will consider stricter notions of reduction that may represent a sufficient condition for two
theories’ truth predicates to be conceptually equivalent, although arguably not a necessary
one due to their strictness.
1.2. Classes and truths. In formal terms, the result of extending a base arithmetical
theory with truth axioms has been often regarded as another, perhaps more succint way of
extending it with further ontological assumptions on the existence of sets of natural num-
bers. Famously (Feferman, 1991) has employed truth axioms as a device to investigate the
limits of predicativity given the natural numbers. This programme finds its roots in the
inter-reducibility of suitable truth axioms with certain fragments of ramified analysis. These
mutual reductions may be of interest for multiple reasons. In general, relating truth with
certain forms of membership may help in harmonizing analyses of semantic, set-theoretic,
and property-theoretic paradoxes. Moreover, trading-off ontological commitment to sets
with semantic commitment to truth axioms may be attractive for philosophers interested
6 For various approaches to the notion of concept in philosophy and cognitive science, we refer
to (Laurence & Margolis, 1999). Woodfield (1991) also considers conceptions, but his notion is
very close to the usual notion of concept employed in psychology.
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in reducing assumptions on the existence of sets to syntactic objects and ideology (Halbach,
2014).7
The strict notions of reduction that will be investigated in the first part of the paper will
shed light on the folklore reductions between suitable truth axioms and certain forms of
comprehension—the ones considered by Halbach and Feferman, for instance—and yield
a surprising picture in which semantic and set-theoretic assumptions fail to be equivalent.
In particular, in this picture ontological commitments seem to be reducible to semantic
assumptions but not vice versa.
§2. Truth predicates and theoretical equivalence. In this section I extract from the
recent literature some desiderata for adequacy of systems of truth (I mainly refer to Leitgeb
(2007), Halbach & Horsten (2015)) to find plausible candidates for conceptual properties
of a theory’s truth predicate besides the vicinity to some semantic construction. The criteria
seem to oscillate between genuinely truth theoretic, or ‘conceptual’ ones, and criteria on
the systems qua mathematical objects, although in the axiomatic context the boundaries
between the two kinds are often very difficult to trace. In the following list, T and W
will denote theories extending a base theory B with one or more truth predicates. The
fundamental idea behind the listing is that it cannot be the case T and W are seen as
conceptually equivalent and yet they disagree on some of the desiderata below. It should
be clear that the list is by no means exhaustive: I simply appeal to criteria that acquired
some general consensus to guide our formal analysis.
Ontological commitments. This requirement can be paraphrased as follows: suppose T
and W display the same conception of truth. If T enables one to interpret the objects of the
domain to which truth is ascribed as the intended bearers of truth, typically sentence types,
also W should do so. A more general formulation of this criterion may be as follows: same-
ness of conception entails preservation of the ontological commitments of the theories.8
The very possibility of comparing truth predicates, let alone equating them, appears to be
rooted in the possibility of applying them to structurally similar linguistic-mathematical
objects. It is known, for instance, that there are theories of truth that do not have ω-models,
such as FS (cf. Halbach (2014); Friedman & Sheard (1987)). It would be embarrassing,
for any satisfactory notion of equivalence of conception of truth, to pair FS with theories
that admit standard models.
Truth-theoretic generalizations. The provability of generalizations involving the truth
predicate may be seen as a formal rendering of the requirement, for the truth predicate,
of adequately ‘expressing infinite conjunctions’ or allowing for ‘semantic ascent’.9 In other
7 For instance, in Halbach (2014), we read:
...I expect that not only truth theories can be applied to eliminate ontological
commitments, but that the work on proof theory also sheds light on how semantic
and ontological commitment are related. [...] In particular, the reductions of
second-order theories to truth theories may be taken as evidence that ontological
commitment can be replaced with ideological or semantic commitment, or
perhaps even that there is no very clear distinction between the two kinds of
commitment. (Halbach, 2014, p. 318)
8 Preservation of ontological commitment may also be intended not as identity of the syntactic
universe, but as isomorphism of the structures of the ‘objects of truth’. I will allow for this
possibility, although I will not focus on similar cases.
9 Some authors think that equating ‘expressing infinite conjunctions’ with ‘proving universally
quantified statements involving truth’ is a hasty move. This is the case of (Halbach, 1999), for
instance. Some others, such as (Cies´lin´ski, 2010), find the equation harmless.
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words if the notions of truth associated with T and W are conceptually equivalent, we expect
the existence of an effective procedure that enables one to translate (provable) generaliza-
tions involving the truth predicate(s) of T , e.g., stating that all members of a countable set
S of formulas are true, into general claims involving the truth predicate(s) of W , in which
the formulas expressing membership in S in W and T apply to the same syntactic objects.
The requirement in italic should not be underestimated: we will consider below cases of
theories that satisfy the condition just stated only by means of resources other than truth.
Reducibility. The debate over truth-theoretic deflationism has prompted an extensive
literature on the reducibility of semantic resources to the underlying object theory—for
an overview, cf. Horsten (2011). There are at least three notions of reductions that may be
considered. The first is definability: it is obvious that this is not available in the case of truth.
The second is conservativity: a notion of truth may help in reaching consequences that were
not provable by the object theory only. The third is relative interpretability: although the
notion of truth is not definable in the syntactic base theory, its behaviour may be replicated
by notions that work on a suitable relativization of the syntactic domain. Conservativity and
interpretability, besides having deep philosphical implications, are measures of strength of
the theories of truth. We require them to be preserved in adequate formal renderings of
conceptual equivalence of truth predicates.
Compositionality. In general, we welcome the possibility of understanding the truth of
a compound sentence only by knowing the truth values of the compounding sentences
(for as many objects to which the truth predicate can be applied as we can find). For the
truth predicates of T and W to display the same conception of truth, both theories should
have this property: if TrT (ϕ∧ψ) can be understood—in T —as ‘TrT ϕ and TrT ψ, also
TrW (ϕ∧ψ)∗ (where (·)∗ is an appropriate isomorphism between the syntactic universes),
should be understood analogously in W . It cannot be the case, for instance, that T is able to
decompose sentences compositionally only for an initial portion of the syntactic universe
(perhaps only for standard syntactic objects), whereas W can do so for any sentence in the
domain of our quantifiers. As a consequence, this criterion enables us to separate between
disquotational and compositional theories.
Symmetry. Under the assumption that T features one single truth predicate Tr, the in-
ternal theory of T is defined as the set of ϕ such that T  Trϕ. The external theory
of T simply the set of ϕ such that T  ϕ. When the external and the internal theories
of T coincide, T is said to be symmetric. If T and W embody equivalent conceptions of
truth and if T can be consistently made symmetric, this should also be possible for W . A
mismatch between the internal and the external theories, although often unavoidable, is an
unpleasant sign: it may suggest that the meaning externally assigned to logical connectives
shifts once we move under the scope of the truth predicate.
Finite axiomatizability (with no additional resources). Often accompanied by the com-
positionality requirement, the finite axiomatizability of a theory of truth is sometimes
related to the learnability, by human beings, of truth values for infinitely many sentences
starting with finite instructions.10 It would appear at least questionable for T and W being
considered conceptually equivalent, but T be presented as a finite set of clauses whereas W
as an infinite list of instructions. This desideratum is often stressed in relation to Davidson’s
program, but it is not clear why the requirement cannot be extended to recursive, instead
of finite, sets of formulas. After all, isn’t the schema ϕ → ϕ learnable, even though it has
infinitely many instantiations? Perhaps a distinction can be made by instances of schemata
characterizing logical vocabulary only and instances of schemata concerning nonlogical
10 This is a famous Davidsonian theme. See Davidson (1984).
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vocabulary, but it’s not our intention here to follow this line of reasoning any further. Since
we are dealing with formal systems of truth, in fact, there is enough evidence supporting
the claim that the truth predicate of a finitely axiomatizable theory may considerably differ
from the truth predicate of a non finitely axiomatizable theory; for instance, the former
may not be reducible to the object theory, whereas the latter may well be.11
Type restrictions. We will require the (non) applicability of the truth predicate to sen-
tences containing semantic vocabulary to be part of the conception of truth arising from
some axiomatic theory. That said, it is not immediately clear what the distinction between
typed and type-free truth may be.12 We shall be content with the following condition:
T will be dubbed as type-free if it proves the truth of a particular sentence containing the
truth predicate.
2.1. Theories, base theories, theories of truth. Theories of truth require a theory of
the objects to which truth applies: in our case eternal, context-free sentence-types. In turn it
is well-known that, modulo synonymy (cf. §2.2), direct axiomatizations of syntax or finite
sets coincide with suitable arithmetical theories. The main role of the underlying syntax
theory is to state the relevant syntactic notions and operations needed for truth ascriptions
and to prove their relevant properties: to this purpose, the standard choice of PA as base
theory seems unnecessarily strong. In this work I will employ elementary arithmetic EA as
base theory: it is a properly weaker theory than PA or I1.13 EA captures in fact in a direct
and natural way the standard development of the syntax of first-order theories, as carried
out for instance in Feferman (1960); Smorynski (1977) for PA and PRA.14 More on the
choice of EA can be found in §4.1.
Officially, EA is formulated in a first-order, relational language L with logical con-
stants in {¬,∧, ∀} featuring finitely many relation symbols Z(x) (‘x is identical to zero’),
S(x, y) (‘y is the successor of x’), E(x, y) (‘y is 2x ’), A(x, y, z) (‘z is the sum of x and
y’), M(x, y, z) (‘z is the product of x and y’). With x 	= y, expressions of the form
(∀x ≤ y)(ϕ(x)) and (∃x ≤ y)(ϕ(x)) are said to be obtained from ϕ(v) by bounded
quantification. The class of formulas of L that contain only bounded quantifiers will be
referred to as the class of elementary formulas. The set of axioms of EA contains, besides
the logical axioms of predicate logic with identity formulated in a Hilbert-style calcu-
lus, the functionality (including totality) axioms for the relation symbols just introduced
and axioms corresponding to their recursive clauses such as (the universal closures of)
Z(y) ∧ S(y, z) → (E(x, z) ↔ x = y)
S(x0, x1) ∧ A(z0, z0, z1) →
(
E(x0, z0) ↔ E(x1, z1)
)
.
11 We discuss the finite axiomatizability criterion further in §4.1.
12 Halbach (2014, chap. 10) proposes the satisfaction of the criteria as sufficient conditions for a
system of truth T to be typed:
1. Only sentences not containing used or mentioned occurrences of the truth predicate should
be deemed true by the theory;
2. the theory should not rule out the possibility of picking any set definable in the base theory
as extension of the truth predicate restricted to sentences containing the truth predicate itself.
13 More precisely, the consistency of EA can be proved already in PRA, which is known to be
conservatively extended by I1 for 2-formulas.
14 Yet, we are far from being close to the theoretical lower bounds. For this purpose, one might
choose a theory interpretable in Q as in Nicolai (2016a).
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In addition, we have the schema of bounded induction for elementary (0) formulas:
Z(x) ∧ ϕ(x) ∧ ∀y, y0 (ϕ(y) ∧ S(y, y0) → ϕ(y0)) → ∀y ϕ(y). (Ind-0)
Partial truth-definitions are available in I0: they can be used to show that EA is finitely
axiomatizable (cf. Hájek & Pudlák (1998, chap. V)). In working with EA, I will often
employ functional expressions for elementary functions,15 such as S(x), as unofficial
counterparts of the relations just introduced. In practice I work in a definitional extension
of EA, assuming in the background the possibility of translating back the unofficial abbre-
viations into the official signatures by eliminating terms via (suitably bounded) existential
quantifiers.
The formalization of the syntax of first-order theories in EA is carried out without
difficulties: the details of one such coding can be found, for instance, in Schwichtenberg
and Wainer (2011). Par abus de language, we denote with e the formal code of e. We also
avail ourselves with symbols for elementary functions such that EA ‘proves’ the following
equations, with ϕ,ψ L0-formulas and xi a (meta)variable of L0—standing for vi1 :
R
.
(x1, . . . , xn) = R(x1, . . . , xn) ng(ϕ) = ¬ϕ dn(ϕ) = ¬¬ϕ
and(ϕ, ψ) = ϕ ∧ ψ all(v, ϕ) = ∀vϕ.
The operation ϕ(v), t → ϕ(t) of substituting a ‘term’ for a free variable in a formula is
naturally represented in EA by an elementary formula sub(x, y, u, v) such that
EA  ∀x, y, u ∃!v sub(x, y, u, v)
EA  sub(ϕ(xi ), xi, t, y) → y = ϕ(t).
For notational convenience, I will write sub as if it were a function. We also write
〈x1, . . . , xn〉 to designate in EA a finite sequence, (x)i to indicate the i th element of the
sequence x , lh(x) for its length. All these operations correspond to elementary functions
and are provably total in EA. I will also extensively employ the following elementary
syntactic notions relative to some elementary presented theory T in L0:
FmlL0(x) ‘x is is the code of an L0-formula’
FmliL0(x) ‘x is is the code of an L0-formula with i variables free’
SentL0(x) ‘x is is the code of an L0-sentence’
AxT (x) ‘x is a logical or nonlogical axiom of T ’
PrfT (x, y) ‘x is a proof of y in T ’.
From the canonical proof predicate PrfT (x, y) one defines the provability predicate PrT (x)
as ∃y PrfT (x, y), expressing that there is a proof (a sequence of axioms or formulas
obtained from the axioms by applications of the rules of inference) of x in T . The
15 The class of elementary functions E is obtained by closing the initial functions zero(·), suc(·), +,
×, 2x , Pni (x1, . . . , xn) = xi with (1 ≤ i ≤ n), truncated subtraction x−˙y under the operations
of composition and bounded minimalization:
H(x) = F(G1(x), . . . , Gn(x)); (μt ≤ y) P(x, t) =
{
the least t ≤ y s.t. P(x, t)
0, if there is no such t
where F, G are elementary functions and P an elementary predicate. EA has sufficient resources
to naturally introduce new relations corresponding to the elementary functions by proving their
defining equations.
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1-sentence Con(T ), expressing an intensionally correct consistency statement for T , is
then simply Con(T ) :↔ ¬PrT (⊥), where ⊥ codes a falsity in T .
In this paper we will mostly deal with the language L of EA expanded with one (or
more) truth predicates and with extensions T of EA with axioms governing the behaviour
of these predicates. In formulating the truth axioms in a relational setting, it is useful to
resort to the fact that EA can represent the language ‘L plus domain constants’ via an
injection x → cx formally associating each object x in the sense of T with these new
constants. We will still call L this expanded formal language internally represented in L
itself and write x to denote these formal objects; the new formal constants will enable us
to quantify into Gödel corners in the usual way. We write ϕ(x˙) or sub(ϕ(v), x) for
sub(ϕ(v), v, x).
A sound translation function τ : LP(:= L∪{P}) → L1, applied to sentences of the form
PPt and replacing P(·) with someL1-formula ξ(·), should of course yield ξ(τ. Pt) and
not ξ(Pt), where the notation τ
.
(·) refers to a functional expression in L representing τ
in EA. To achieve the required translation, one may resort to the recursion theorem (see
§11.2 of Rogers (1987)) that applies equally well to elementary functions; it yields for
any recursive f (x, y) an index e such that f (e, y) ∼= φe(y), where φ(·)(·) is the universal
program. We can then define an elementary translation function τ0 such that, in the relevant
case, τ0(x, PPt) = ξ(φ
. x
(Pt)) and apply the recursion theorem to find an index e for
τ0 such that φe(PPt) = ξ(φ
. e
(Pt)). We can then let τ (x) ∼= φe(x).
When not otherwise specified, EA will be the base theory for our theories of truth. I do
not attempt at giving sufficient conditions for what counts for a theory of truth, although I
will often employ this expression. I hope that my choices will be self-explanatory and at
any rate they are based on widely accepted choices.
I will employ different measures of the complexity of formulas: the positive complexity
|ϕ|+ of a formula ϕ is 0 for atomic and negated atomic formulas; it is |ψ |+ + 1 if ϕ is
¬¬ψ or ∀xψ , it is max(|χ |+, |ψ |+) + 1 if ϕ is χ ∧ ψ . The logical complexity of a for-
mula ϕ—formalized as lc(ϕ)—is simply the number of its logical symbols. These mea-
sures of complexity correspond to elementary functions and can be naturally represented
in EA.
2.2. Interpretations and isomorphisms. The notion of relative interpretation and its
variants will be central in this work, so they deserve careful introduction. We will consider
only relational languages with finite signatures.
A relative translation of LT into LW can be described as a pair (δ, F) where δ is a
LW -formula with one free variable—the domain of the translation—and F is a (finite)
mapping that takes n-ary relation symbols of LT and gives back formulas of LW with n
free variables. The translation extends, modulo suitable renaming of bound variables,16 to
the mapping τ :
• (R(x1, . . . , xn))τ :↔ F(R)(x1, . . . , xn);
• τ commutes with propositional connectives;
• (∀x ϕ(x))τ :↔ ∀x (δ(x) → ϕτ ).
DEFINITION 2.1. An (one-dimensional) interpretation K is specified by a triple (T, τ, W ),
where τ is a translation of LT in LW , such that for all formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) of LT with
the free variables displayed, we have:
16 For more details on how clashes are avoided, I refer to (Visser, 1997).
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if T  ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), then W  ∧ni=1 δK (xi ) → ϕτ .
I write K : T → W for ‘K is an interpretation of T in W ’. An interpretation is direct if it
maps identity to identity and it does not relativize quantifiers. I will often not distinguish
between an interpretation and the relative translation that supports it. T and W are said to
be mutually interpretable if there are interpretations K : T → W and L : W → T . Since
interpretability is a partial preorder on theories, mutual interpretability is an equivalence
relation (its equivalence classes are known as degrees of interpretability).
I will often refer to a useful, model-theoretic characterization of interpretability. If
K : T → W and M is any model of W , then K can be seen as a method for defining
a model MK of T inside M.
LEMMA 2.2. If K : T → W is identity preserving and W has full induction, then for
any M  W we find a (uniformly) M-definable embedding of M into an initial segment
of MK .17
Lemma 2.2 is obtained by noticing that in M we can define an injection f : M → MK
such that, again by employing a convenient functional notation,
f (0M) → 0MK ; f (x +M 1M) → f (x) +MK 1MK
f (x +M y) → f (x) +MK f (y) f (x ×M y) → f (x) ×MK f (y).
Full induction in M is needed to prove the totality of f . f is clearly an isomorphism of
M in MK .
Given an intensionally correct consistency statement Con(T ), for T elementary pre-
sented,18 one can construct a formalized Henkin model of T in EA+Con(T ): the model is
constructed in the standard way by means of Henkin axioms and it is equipped with a truth
predicate—though not a truth predicate working for all sentences in the sense of T :
LEMMA 2.3. Let the axiom set of T be captured by an elementary predicate. Then,
EA+Con(T ) interprets T .
To introduce stronger notions of interpretations, I introduce compositions of interpre-
tations. Given τ0 : LT → LW and τ1 : LW → LV , the composite of K = (T, τ0, W )
and L = (W, τ1, V ) is the interpretation L ◦ K = (T, τ1 ◦ τ0, V ), where
δL◦K (x) :↔ δLK (x) ∧ δL(x). Two interpretations K0, K1 : T → W are equal if W , the
target theory, proves this. In particular, one requires,
W  ∀x (δK0(x) ↔ δK1(x))
W  ∀x (RK0(x) ↔ RK1(x)) for any relation symbol R of LT
A W - definable morphism between (again, one-dimensional) interpretations K0, K1 : T →
W is a triple (K0, φ, K1), with φ a LW -formula with two free variables, satisfying:
W  ∀x, y (φ(x, y) → (δK0(x) ∧ δK1(y))) (2)
W  ∀x, y, u, v(x =K0 y ∧ u =K1 v ∧ φ(y, u) → φ(x, v)) (3)
W  ∀x (δK0(x) → ∃y (δK1(y) ∧ φ(x, y))) (4)
17 The condition on identity is redundant although not obviously so.
18 The same holds even if we allow T to be presented by a p-time set of axioms. A proof by Albert
Visser of this stronger claim can be found in Visser (1991). See also Nicolai (2016a).
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W  ∀x, y, z(φ(x, y) ∧ φ(x, z) → y =K1 z) (5)
W  ∀x1, . . . , xn∀y1, . . . , yn
( n∧
i=1
φ(xi , yi ) ∧ RK0(x1, . . . , xn) → RK1(y1, . . . , yn))
)
(6)
for any relation R ∈ LT .
To obtain an isomorphism from K0 to K1 one needs to add the following, extra conditions:
W  ∀y (δK1(y) → ∃x (δK0(x) ∧ φ(x, y)) (7)
W  ∀x, y, z (φ(x, y) ∧ φ(z, y) → x =K0 z) (8)
W  ∀x1, . . . , xn∀y1, . . . , yn
( n∧
i=1
φ(xi , yi ) ∧ RK1(y1, . . . , yn) → RK0(x1, . . . , xn)
)
(9)
for any relation R ∈ LT .
We write F : K0 ∼= K1 for ‘F is an isomorphism from the interpretation K0 to K1’.
2.3. Sameness of theories. In this subsection I introduce two noticeable notions of
sameness of theories extending extensional identity: bi-interpretability and synonymy
(cf. Visser (2006), Friedman & Visser (2014)). They will play an important role in what
follows.
DEFINITION 2.4 (Synonymy). U and V are synonymous if and only if there are interpre-
tations K : U → V and L : V → U such that V proves that K ◦ L and idV are equal and,
symmetrically, U proves that L ◦ K is equal to idU .
One can check that for U and V formulated in disjoint signatures, U and V are synonymous
if and only if they have a common definitional extension. As shown in Kaye & Wong
(2007), for instance, ZF minus the axiom of infinity plus its negation and ‘every set has a
transitive closure’ is synonymous with PA.19
To introduce a slightly less strict notion of equivalence, bi-interpretability, we first con-
sider the notion of a retract, that in turn relies on the notion of isomorphism of
interpretations introduced in the previous section.
DEFINITION 2.5 (Retract). U is a retract of V if and only if there are K : U → V and
L : V → U and a U-definable isomorphism between L ◦ K and idU .
The category-theoretic lexicon is due to Visser’s systematization of various notions of
equivalence of theories in terms of appropriate categories of theories and interpretations
(Visser, 2006). We refer to Visser’s outstanding paper for further insights on the category-
theoretic presentation. The notion of retract can also be visualized in model-theoretic
terms: as it is illustrated in Figure 1, when K : U → V and L : V → U , U is a retract of
V if in any model M  U we can construct an internal ML  V which in turn defines a
model (ML)K  U and there is an M-definable isomorphism F : (ML)K ∼=M.
Essentially, U and V are bi-interpretable if and only if U is a retract of V and V is a
retract of U using the same pair of interpretations.
19 ZF minus infinity plus its negation, rather surprisingly, is neither synonymous nor bi-interpretable
with PA, (cf. Enayat, Schmerl, & Visser (2010)).
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020316000435
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. King's College London, on 26 Jul 2019 at 08:47:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
332 CARLO NICOLAI
M  U
ML  V
(ML )K ∼=M
Fig. 1. U is a retract of V .
DEFINITION 2.6 (Bi-interpretability). Given a pair of interpretations K : U → V and
L : V → U, U and V are bi-interpretable if and only if (i) there is a LV -formula F0
such that V proves F0 to be an isomorphism between K ◦ L and idV and (ii) there is an
LU -formula F1 such that U proves F1 to be an isomorphism between L ◦ K and idU .
Clearly, if U and V are synonymous, they are also bi-interpretable. The converse is, prov-
ably, not true. In Friedman & Visser (2014) it is shown, for instance, that Adjunctive Set
theory and its two-sorted, flattened version with a Frege function are bi-interpretable but
not synonymous. Bi-interpretability preserves many mathematical properties of the theo-
ries: decidability, finite axiomatizability (cf. Lemma 2.8), κ-categoricity. That synonymy is
a stricter notion than bi-interpretability follows from the fundamental insight that the latter
does preserve the automorphism group of models modulo isomorphism but not the action
of the automorphism group on the domain of the model. Synonymy preserves both.
An important fact linking synonymy and bi-interpretability is the following, involving
the so-called sequential theories.20
LEMMA 2.7 (Friedman & Visser, 2014). Let U, V be sequential. If K : U → V and
L : V → U witness a bi-interpretation of U and V and L is unrelativized and identity
preserving, then U and V are synonymous.
As hinted above, synonymy and interpretability can be seen, respectively, as equality and
isomorphism in appropriate categories INT0 and INT1 of theories and interpretations (cf.
Visser (2006)). A category-theoretic framework is arguably the best way to formulate a
general theory of inter-theoretic reductions: in this paper, however, we will only employ the
category-theoretic jargon as convenient notation. Since it will be relevant in what follows,
we conclude the subsection with a sketch of the proof that bi-interpretability (and thus,
synonymy), preserves finite axiomatizability.
LEMMA 2.8 (Visser, 2006). Let U, V be theories in finite signatures. Assume that
K : U → V and L : V → U are interpretations and that U defines an isomorphism
F from L ◦ K to idU . Assume further that V is finitely axiomatizable. Then U is finitely
axiomatizable.
Proof sketch. Let V0 be the conjunction of a finite axiomatization of V . A finite U0 ⊆ U
is specified by the single sentences: (i) F is an isomorphism between L ◦ K and idU ;
20 A theory is sequential if it directly interprets Adjunctive set theory. More informally, a theory is
sequential is it has a good coding of sequences. See Friedman & Visser (2014) for details.
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(ii) V L0 . The theory U0 is, by definition of retract, a subtheory of U . For the converse
direction, one verifies that if U proves the sentence ϕ, then U0  ϕK L by (ii) and the
definition of retract. Thus U0  ϕ by (i). 
§3. The usual suspects. One option to formally capture the notion of conceptual
equivalence of truth predicates may be to consider the truth-free consequences of the
theories that characterize them. This is notoriously a bad idea. For my purposes here, it
is useful to support this claim by introducing two theories that will be employed also in
later sections.
DEFINITION 3.1. The theory EAT in LT := L ∪ {T} is obtained by formulating EA in the
new language and allowing the truth predicate into instances of 0-Ind. EAt, in turn, only
features arithmetical 0-induction.
DEFINITION 3.2 (TB). The theory TB is obtained by extending EAT with all instances of
the schema
Tϕ ↔ ϕ (tb)
for ϕ a sentence of L. TB is obtained by adding (tb) to EAt.
The other theory is essentially the axiom set introduced by Feferman and inspired to the
Strong Kleene version of Kripke’s theory of truth (Cantini, 1989; Feferman, 1991).
DEFINITION 3.3 (KF). KF extends EAt with the universal closures of the following:
(TR(x˙1, . . . , x˙n) ↔ R(x1, . . . , xn)) ∧ (Tng(R(x˙1, . . . , x˙n)) ↔ ¬R(x1, . . . , xn)) Tat
SentLT(x) →
(
Tdn(x) ↔ Tx) T1
SentLT(and(x, y)) →
(
Tand(x, y) ↔ Tx ∧ Ty) T2
SentLT(and(x, y)) →
(
Tng(and(x, y)) ↔ Tng(x) ∨ Tng(y)) T3
SentLT(all(v, x)) →
(
Tall(v, x) ↔ ∀y Tsub(x, y)) T4
SentLT(all(v, x)) →
(
Tng(all(v, x)) ↔ ∃y Tsub(ng(x), y)) T5
TTx˙ ↔ Tx T6
Tng(Tx˙) ↔ Tng(x) T7
Tx → SentLT(x) T8
The arguments that witness the conservativeness of TB and KF over EA are well-known.
For TB one replaces in every derivation in TB of a truth-free formula the truth predicate
with an EA-definable, partial truth predicate. In the second case, starting with any model of
EA (in the language with domain constants), we expand it via a positive inductive definition
of a Kripke truth set to a model of KF (see §4 of Cantini (1989)).
LEMMA 3.4. TB, EA, and KF prove the same L-theorems.
By contrast, it is not hard to see that KF andTB fare much differently with respect to
the conditions in §2. TB is typed and KF is type-free; KF is compositional to a large
extent—only negation, for obvious reasons, does not fully commute with T—whereas TB
can hardly be thought as compositional: for instance, TB cannot prove the sentence
∀x, y (SentL
(
and(x, y)) → (T(and(x, y)) ↔ (Tx ∧ Ty))). (10)
The unprovability of (10) also suggests that TB falls short of many generalizations provable
in KF, suggesting that also this desideratum separates the two theories. Finally, TB and
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KF are theories whose truth predicates capture, in the sense of Fischer et al. (2015)
instantiated by (1), different semantic constructions: the Tarskian truth set and the fixed
points of Kripke’s theory of truth respectively.
The case just considered is not isolated: It is not hard to find many other counterexam-
ples to the claim that the provability of the same truth-free consequences amounts to an
adequate formal rendering of the conceptual equivalence of two theories’ truth predicates.
An alternative may be represented by mutual interpretability. A little reflection shows,
however, that mutual interpretability suffers from a problem that is in a sense opposite
to the one suffered by provability of the same base-theoretic consequences: it mixes up
syntactic and semantic aspects of our theories.
LEMMA 3.5 (Feferman). Any T ⊇ EA interprets T + ¬Con(T ).
Proof sketch. This proof is due to Visser and, independently, to Lindström; it does not
rely on the reflexivity of the theory involved and therefore suits our purposes. By Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem, T  Con(T ) → Con(T + ¬Con(T )), therefore T +
Con(T ) interprets T +¬Con(T ) by Lemma 2.3, let’s say with an interpretation K . Finally
we combine the identity interpretation on T + ¬Con(T ) and K : if Con(T ), pick K , if
¬Con(T ), idT+¬Con(T ) suffices. 
By Lemma 3.5, any theory of truth over EA will mutually interpret its inconsistency.
Since we usually require syntactic notions—including Con(T)—to be canonically con-
structed and T to be ω-consistent, any theory of truth will be ‘equivalent’ with a theory
that compromises our basic assumptions on the structure of syntactic universe.21 Mutual
interpretability does not guarantee that the structure of the so-called bearers of truth
remains fixed across theories. For the reasons explained in §2, this seems to undermine
the very possibility of comparing truth predicates.22
To overcome these and further difficulties with assuming provability of the same base-
theoretic consequences or mutual interpretability as formal counterparts of conceptual
equivalence of two theories of truth, we may resort to the notion of relative truth-
definability due to Fujimoto (2010) and Halbach (2014). In a nutshell, T is truth-definable
in W if there is a direct, relative interpretation of T in W that preserves the vocabulary
of the syntactic base theory B. I give a more pedantic definition to fix some notation,
starting with an arbitrary base theory B containing EA. It is convenient here to consider
the language of our theories of truth as extending the base language LB with an indexed
set of semantic predicates {Si }i∈I : we want to allow in fact for the possibility that truth is
expressed via, for instance, a binary satisfaction predicate.
21 An advocate of mutual interpretability, at this point, may highlight the artificiality of the theories
like T + ¬Con(T ). After all, they are artifacts just right to reach 1-unsoundness, therefore
ω-inconsistency. However, more natural examples are not difficult to construct. To mention a
familiar example, let us consider the theory TB[PA] just introduced and the theory resulting from
extending PA with restricted induction with Tat, the typed versions of T2,T4 and
SentL(x) →
(
Tng(x) ↔ ¬Tx), (11)
known in the literature as CT [PA] or PAFT. TB[PA] and CT [PA] are mutually interpretable,
as CT [PA] is interpretable in PA (cf. Enayat & Visser (2015)), but the theories fare rather
differently in terms of the conditions in §2 and do not share the same conception of truth in
the sense defined above.
22 Fujimoto (2010) already employed Feferman’s theorem on the interpretability of inconsistency—
applied to TB—to argue against mutual interpretability as a notion of theoretical equivalence for
theories of truth. For a recent, thorough study of Feferman’s theorem, see Visser (2015).
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DEFINITION 3.6 (Truth translation). A truth-translation τ : LT → LW , where LT =
LB ∪ {Si }i∈I and L ∈ LT ∩ LW , is a pair (d, F), where d(x) is x = x and F a mapping
of n-ary predicates of LT into LW formulas with n free variables satisfying:
τ (R)(x) :↔ R(x) for n-ary R ∈ LB ;
τ (Si )(x) :↔ F(Si )(x) for i ∈ I
τ (¬ϕ) :↔ ¬τ (ϕ)
τ (ϕ ∧ ψ) :↔ τ (ϕ) ∧ τ (ψ)
τ(∀xϕ) :↔ ∀x(d(x) → τ (ϕ)).
The mapping F behaves like the identity function when applied to base-theoretic, nonlog-
ical symbols. Moreover, the translation is clearly unrelativized.
DEFINITION 3.7 (Relative truth-definition). A truth-definition of a theory T in LT =
LB ∪ {Si }i∈I —with I an index set—in a theory W is a triple (T, τ, W ), where τ is a
truth-translation of LT into LW and for all LT -sentences ϕ, if T  ϕ, then W  τ (ϕ).
Like relative interpretability, relative truth-definability is a partial preorder. We call two
theories of truth T and W mutually truth-definable if there are truth-definitions K : T →
W and L : W → T . Mutual truth-definability defines indeed an equivalence relation
on theories. As Fujimoto (2010) points out, it is immediate from the definition that if W
truth-defines T and any M  B admits an expansion to a model of W , then M admits
an expansion to a model of T .23 Also, due to the non-relativization of quantifiers, if T
is 1-unsound or ω-inconsistent and T is truth-definable in W , W will be 1-unsound
or ω-inconsistent. Therefore, mutual truth-definability prevents the possibility of equating
theories with non-isomorphic ontological commitments. Also, it takes care of what the
theory proves true as if T truth defines W , there should be a formula of the language of T
defining the extension of the truth predicate of W —in the case of a single truth predicate in
W —simulating the behaviour of this truth predicate. But is this enough to conclude that the
truth predicates of mutually truth-definable theories embody the same conception of truth?
There are well-known examples, it seems, that suggest a negative answer to this question.
We consider some of them.
In the following a formula of LT will be said to be T-positive if and only if T does not
occur, in ϕ, in the scope of an odd number of negation signs. Halbach (2009) introduced
and motivated a collection of type-free, uniform T -sentences that escape the Liar paradox
by controlling the behaviour of negation.
DEFINITION 3.8. PUTB is the theory obtained by extending EAT with the schema
∀x(T(ϕ(x˙)) ↔ ϕ(x)) (putb)
for all T-positive formulas ϕ of LT .
DEFINITION 3.9. KF is the theory obtained by extending EAT with Tat-T7.
LEMMA 3.10. PUTB is a subtheory of KF.
23 This is simply because the numbers of the two models are the same, and the truth-definition
ensures that the right extension of the truth predicates of T can be always extracted via the
extension of the truth predicate of W .
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Lemma 3.10 is obtained by showing, via a meta-induction on the positive complexity
of LT-formulas, that (putb) is provable in KF. Trivially, therefore, KF defines the truth
predicate of PUTB. More interestingly, Halbach (2009) also shows that
LEMMA 3.11. PUTB defines the truth predicate of KF.
Proof sketch. EAT proves the diagonal lemma in parametrized form, i.e.,: for any
LT-formula ϕ(x, y), we find a unary formula ψ(y) such that
EAT  ϕ(y) ↔ ψ(ϕ(y), y). (12)
Now if we let I(x,Ty) be a LT-formula that mimics the positive inductive definition of
a Kripke truth-set under the scope of T (see p. 190 of Halbach (2014)), (12) will yield a
formula θ(x) such that
EAT  θ(x) ↔ I(x,Tθ(x)). (13)
Since in θ(x) there are only positive occurrences of T, they can be removed so that one can
verify that θ(x) satisfies all axioms of KF. 
If mutual truth-definability were a sufficient condition to establish the conceptual equiv-
alence of the theories’ truth predicates, the concepts of truth associated with PUTB and KF
would be equivalent. This is the position taken, for instance, by Fujimoto (2010).24 Despite
their mutual truth-definability, PUTB and KF fare much differently with respect to the
criteria highlighted in §2. Firstly, PUTB is can hardly be considered to be compositional
and it cannot prove as many general claims as KF by using its own notion of truth. As
shown in Halbach (2009, Lemma 6.1), in fact, any proof in PUTB only employs positive
disquotational sentences applied to LT-sentences ϕ with limited, standard complexity. But
there is more: PUTB can be consistently made symmetric, that is the result of closing
PUTB under the rules
(T-in) ϕ(x)
Tϕ(x˙) (T-out)
Tϕ(x˙)
ϕ(x)
for ϕ(v) ∈ LT, yields a consistent theory.25 It is in fact possible to rule out putative proofs
of inconsistencies in PUTB plus (T-in) and (T-out) in the following way: if (T-out) and
24 He writes:
...[the mutual truth-definability of KF and PUTB] may be still interpreted
to indicate that KF and PUTB are indeed ‘conceptually equivalent’ despite
superficial differences. (Fujimoto, 2010, p. 342)
To be fair with Fujimoto’s position, he also claims:
...we propose [relative truth-definability, A/N] by means of which we can
represent a certain ‘equivalence’ or ‘reducibility’ among theories of truth from
a more conceptual point of view, although it may be still too coarse to fully
represent ‘conceptual equivalence’ or ‘conceptual reducibility’ (in some strong
sense). Fujimoto (2010)
The issue thus becomes dangerously verbal. At any rate, even if we take mutual truth-definability
to witness a weak form of ‘conceptual equivalence’, what I will say in what follows may be
seen as an invitation to investigate and an attempt to regiment stronger notions of conceptual
equivalence.
25 Of course, to avoid the Liar paradox, (T-in) and (T-out) need to be understood as rules applying
only to theorems and not to assumptions.
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(T-in) are applied to T-positive sentences they can be dispensed with via (putb). Moreover,
in any proof in PUTB plus (T-in) and (T-out) — where the two rules are applied to
sentences that are not T-positive — (i) applications of (T-out) may be eliminated; (ii) the
semantics of PUTB can be adapted to accommodate possible applications of (T-in) (see
Halbach (2014), §19.5, for proofs of these facts). By contrast, KF is essentially asymmetric,
as it cannot be consistently closed under the two rules. Finally, if KF is sound with respect
to fixed points of the four-valued version of Kripke’s semantic construction, PUTB is not
as it has models of the form (N, S) where S is not such a fixed point.
Mutual truth-definability, therefore, does not preserve compositionality (in the sense
specified above), provable generalizations, symmetry, at least if one takes at face value the
truth predicate(s) of the theories. Moreover, mutually truth-definable theories may not be
equally close to a semantic construction. In the next section we will see that not even finite
axiomatizability is preserved. Back to our example, there is no doubt that PUTB has the
resources to replicate the behaviour of the truth predicate of KF via a non-primitive notion,
but this would hardly count as evidence for the claim that PUTB and KF are conceptually
equivalent. For this matter, only the primitive notion of truth of the theories should matter.
§4. Notions of equivalence of truth predicates. In this section I consider the varieties
of equivalences of theories introduced in §2 and investigate whether they may help in
overcoming the problems encountered above. My strategy will be suitably adapting those
definitions to obtain notions that
(I) contain mutual truth-definability—that is, the latter notion will play the role of
necessary condition for the new notions;
(II) properly extend mutual truth-definability so to capture the differences, for
instance, between the truth predicates of PUTB and KF;
(III) are non-empty, in the positive sense that there are natural theories of truth that fall
into the relations.
Since this is in a sense unexplored territory, it is not my main focus to find notions of inter-
theoretic reduction that are just right to capture conceptual equivalence of truth predicates:
by contrast, I look for strict notions that may eventually be relaxed and calibrated to
accommodate our philosophical purposes. In practice, I will proceed as follows: the notions
of retract, bi-interpretability and synonymy from §2.2 are, by definition, not in continuity
with mutual truth-definability. This is simply because they are not fine tuned for theories
extending a common syntax theory with truth axioms: that is, they do not require the
interpretations witnessing them to be unrelativized and behaving like the identity on the
syntactic vocabulary. There may be no such a thing as syntactic vocabulary in them.
Therefore, I modify the definitions of retract and bi-interpretation accordingly by requiring
the composed interpretations to be truth-definitions. I will also not forget about the notion
of bi-interpretability simpliciter and consider examples of theories of truth that are bi-
interpretable but not mutually truth-definable.
DEFINITION 4.1 (t-retract). Let T, W be theories of truth based on a syntactic base theory
B. T is a t-retract of W if there are truth-definitions K : T → W and L : W → T and a
T -definable isomorphism between L ◦ K and idT .
At the intuitive level, if T is a t-retract of W , then W functions as a faithful mirror for T :
the image of T reflected via its truth-definition in W is a faithful one modulo isomorphism.
There is no guarantee, however, that also the converse is true: it may well be the case
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that, when W looks for its image reflected in T via its truth-definition in W , the result is
a distorted image. The notion of t-equivalence, by contrast, requires both theories to be
‘faithful mirrors’ focusing on the same pairs of truth-definitions:
DEFINITION 4.2 (t-equivalence). Let T, W be theories of truth based on B. T and W are
truth equivalent iff there are truth-definitions K : T → W and L : W → T such that (i) T
proves that there is an isomorphism between L ◦ K and idT ; (ii) W proves that there is an
isomorphism between K ◦ L and idW .
It is immediate from the definitions that t-retractions and t-equivalences simply impose
further conditions on mutual truth-definitions. Focusing on them, the fulfillment of desider-
atum (I) on page 16 is then immediately obtained.
LEMMA 4.3. If T is a t-retract of W , then T and W are mutually truth-definable.
A fortiori, if T and W are t-equivalent, then they are mutually truth-definable.
Lemma 2.7 tells us that, since we are dealing with direct interpretations, t-equivalence is a
form of synonymy. I therefore propose the following, quasi-formal thesis:
THESIS 1. If two theories are t-equivalent, their associated semantic notions are con-
ceptually equivalent.
Thesis 1 only imposes sufficient conditions on the conceptual equivalence of semantic
notions. Obviously, it is not a formally precise claim, although its plausibility seems to be
safely grounded in the strictness of the notion of synonymy. Nonetheless, it requires a suit-
able amount of empirical data to be confirmed or dismissed: in the following sections I start
collecting these data by showing that Thesis 1 captures the non-conceptual equivalence of
KF and PUTB and that there are simple, reassuring cases of t-equivalence.
4.1. Separating mutual truth-definability, t-retracts, t-equivalence. In this section I
consider desideratum (II) on page 16 and show that the notions of t-retract and t-equivalence
are properly stricter than mutual truth-definability in a formally precise sense.
PROPOSITION 4.4. PUTB is not finitely axiomatizable.
Proof. Let’s assume that there is a sentence A such that A  PUTB. By the finite
axiomatizability of EA, A has the normal form A0+A1, where A0 is a finite set of instances
of (putb) and A1 is a finite version of EAT . The instances of (putb) in A0 are therefore
applied only to sentences ϕ such that lc(ϕ) ≤ n (the number of logical symbols in ϕ),
for a standard n. By adapting the semantics of PUTB given in Halbach (2009) I show that
there is a model of A that is not a model of PUTB.
Let SentnL+T
be the set of T-positive sentences of LT with no more than n logical symbols
(excluding the identity symbol), for a suitable n ∈ ω and let
C :↔ ¬(0 = 0 ∧ . . . ∧ 0 = 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
∧ applied n-times
)
Notice that, despite the presence of the negation symbol, C is trivially T-positive. We define
the operator  : P(ω) → P(ω):
(S1) :={ϕ ∈ SentnL+T | (N, S1)  ϕ} ∪ {m ∈ S1 : m /∈ Sent
n
L+T
} ∪ {C}.
It should be clear that (·) is monotone. The monotonicity of  entails the existence of
fixed points of  and, in particular, of its minimal fixed point I obtained by closing the
empty set under . It should be noticed that C ∈ I (and it is in any fixed point of ).
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Moreover, (N, I) is a model of A. The axioms of EA clearly hold in (N, I). For ϕ ∈
SentnL+T
, we have
(N, I)  Tϕ ⇔ ϕ ∈ I (= (I))
⇔ (N, I)  ϕ.
To complete the proof of Proposition 4.4: given the assumption of the extensional iden-
tity of A and PUTB, (N, I) would also be a model of PUTB. But then (N, I)  TC,
thus (N, I)  C. That is, the desired contradiction. 
COROLLARY 4.5. PUTB is not finitely axiomatizable.26
Since, by inspection, the theory that we called KF is finitely axiomatizable (recall that we
are constructing KF over EAT!):
COROLLARY 4.6. Relative truth-definability does not preserve finite axiomatizability.
But, by Lemma 2.8, finite axiomatizability is preserved over retractions:
COROLLARY 4.7.
(i) PUTB is not a retract and therefore not a t-retract of KF;
(ii) PUTB and KF are not bi-interpretable, therefore also not t-equivalent.
The argument would still go through if we replace EAT with EAt. Therefore, Corollary 4.7
holds if we replace PUTB and KF with PUTB and KF respectively.
A similar line of reasoning can be applied to other cases, less relevant for our discussion
but still worth considering.
DEFINITION 4.8.
(i) CT is the theory in LT that extends EAt with Tat, the restrictions of T2, T4, T8 to
sentences of L, and the sentence
SentL(x) →
(
Tng(x) ↔ ¬Tx) ()
(ii) UTB is the theory obtained by extending EAt with the schema
∀x (Tϕ(x˙) ↔ ϕ(x)) (utb)
for all formulas ϕ(v) of L with one free variable.
By the finite axiomatizability of EA, it follows that CT is finitely axiomatizable.
A simplified version of the argument in Proposition 4.4 shows that UTB is not finitely
axiomatizable.
COROLLARY 4.9. UTB is not a t-retract of CT. Therefore, CT and UTB are not
t-equivalent.
26 The method of Proposition 4.4 can be applied more generally to yield the non finite
axiomatizability of typed T-sentences over an arbitrary base theory in predicate logic. For
instance, axioms of the form
Tci ↔ ϕi
for all i ∈ ω are not finitely axiomatizable over predicate logic PRED alone.
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Unlike Corollary 4.7, the failure of t-equivalence between UTB and CT does not amount
to a further example separating mutual truth-definability and the stricter notions we are
considering. Although UTB is trivially truth-definable in CT, the converse fails.27
I conclude this subsection with few remarks on desideratum (II) in the light of the
observations above. Corollary 4.7 relies on the finite axiomatizability of KF (and KF) that,
in our setting, is easily reached by the finite axiomatizability of EA. In §2 we included the
finite axiomatizability of a theory as a property that should be preserved between theories
whose truth predicates are considered to be conceptually equivalent. This is a delicate point
and we should pause a little more on it: It would seem in fact that two theories like KF and
KF[PA]—that is Tat − T8 added to EAT or to its version with full induction—should be
conceptually equivalent; yet this is ruled out as KF[PA] is not finitely axiomatizable. Can
this asymmetry threaten the entire project of a formal analysis of conceptual equivalence
between truth theories?
This concern can be addressed by elaborating on what has been already anticipated
in §2. We are considering comparisons of axiomatic systems, and there is considerable
evidence for the claim that theories of truth built on different base theories are in a sense
incomparable. What we compare are combinations of truth-theoretic and syntactic princi-
ples, where a syntax theory is fixed and ‘universal’.28 If we allowed for a comparison of
theories of truth build on non-equiconsistent base theories, for instance, we would violate
some of the very criteria on which truth predicates are in general evaluated. CT [PA], for
instance, is interpretable in PA; CT, by contrast, is provably not interpretable in EA. If we
let CT [PA] and CT share the same conception of truth in the strong sense we are after,
we would also be led to consider as conceptually equivalent a truth predicate that can be
relatively interpreted in the base theory, and a truth predicate that cannot. Therefore two
theories sharing the same conception of truth may be regarded in considerably different
ways by, for instance, advocates of the expressive irreducibility of the notion of truth.
After all, it seems, it’s a sensible choice to keep the syntax theory fixed. But there seem
to be reasons to go even further and motivate the choice of EA as base theory for this
particular project. Its finite axiomatizability harmonizes with the choice of our truth axioms
in a better way than other choices. By adding a suitable infinite set of truth axioms to EA
it may be the case—and it is in the case of TB, UTB and PUTB as defined above—that
we obtain a non finitely axiomatizable extension of EA; by adding a finite set of truth
axioms to it, like in the case of KF and CT, we obtain a finitely axiomatizable extension
of EA. If other choices of the base theories are made, e.g., PA, it is often the case that
the size of our set of truth axioms does not matter for the finite axiomatizability of the
resulting theory of truth. TB[PA], for instance, is not finitely axiomatizable. Despite the
finite axiomatizability of CT, however, CT[PA] is not finitely axiomatizable essentially
because of the reflexivity of PA (cf. Fischer (2009), Leigh (2015), Enayat & Visser (2015)).
4.2. t-equivalence, t-retracts, bi-interpretability: some examples. In this section I
move to desideratum (III) and introduce theories of primitive truth that are t-retracts of
others or that are t-equivalent to others. By definition, t-equivalence satisfies the criteria
for Lemma 2.7 and leads straight to synonymy (or definitional equivalence under minimal
27 Otherwise the theory CT obtained from CT by allowing LT-formulas into the schema of
0-induction will be interpretable in UTB, namely UTB with 0-T induction, quod non as
CT proves Con(EA).
28 By the considerations below it may be possible to allow for bi-interpretable syntax theories, but
surely non-equiconsistent base syntactic theories should be disregarded.
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assumptions). Furthermore, the cases of t-equivalence that I will consider are in fact cases
of equality of truth-definitions. One may think of introducing a notion of t-synonymy that
relates to t-equivalence like synonymy simpliciter does to bi-interpretability. Given Visser
and Friedman’s result and the canonical definition of truth translation, however, this would
not yield any further insights so I stick with the more general notion of t-equivalence.
I consider again extensions of EAT and extensions of EA with a binary satisfaction
predicate. Let tr : LSat → LT and st : LT → LSat, where LSat := L ∪ {Sat} and Sat is a
binary satisfaction predicate, be truth-translations specified by
Sattr(x, y) :↔ Tsb(x, y)
Tst(x) :↔ Sat(〈〉, x),
where 〈〉 denotes the empty sequence and the elementary formula sb(x, y) = z captures
the operation of substituting in a formula y its free variables with the result of applying
the finite mapping x to the free variables of y. We assume the functions sub and sb to be
defined in such a way that in EA we can prove:
sub(ϕ(v), v, x) = sb(〈x〉, ϕ(v)) (14)
∀x (sb(〈〉, x) = x). (15)
In investigating positive results on t-retracts and t-equivalence, I start with a simple
example to fix the basic reasoning involved and then move to slightly more complex cases
of the same sort. Let TBS be EA formulated in LSat plus all instances of the schema
Sat(〈〉, ϕ) ↔ ϕ (tbs)
for all L-sentences ϕ.29
PROPOSITION 4.10.
(i) TB and TBS are mutually truth-definable;
(ii) TB is a t-retract of TBS.
Proof. The only thing to check is 4.10(ii). Since we have truth-definitions, we need to
take care only of the truth predicate. In TB, Ttr◦stx is equivalent to Tsb(〈〉, x) that, by (15),
is equivalent to Tx . The required isomorphism is the identity on TB. 
Here I am not able to employ tr and st to show that TBS is a retract of TB. The reason is that
I cannot prove in TBS the expected interaction of substitution and the satisfaction predi-
cate: informally, I cannot prove that the result of substituting the elements of (x1, . . . , xn)
in ϕ(v1, . . . , vn) is satisfied by the empty sequence exactly when ϕ(v1, . . . , vn) is satisfied
by (x1, . . . , xn). So I let
TBS∗ := TBS ∪ {∀x, y (Sat(〈〉, sb(x, y)) ↔ Sat(x, y))}.
I call D the sentence in curly brackets. That TBS∗ is a natural extension of TBS is justified
by the following claim:
LEMMA 4.11. TBS∗ and TB are mutually truth-definable.
29 Here I consider the case in which 0-induction is extended to LSat, but the same argument goes
through for the corresponding theories with restricted induction.
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Proof. That TBS∗ defines the truth predicate of TB follows from Proposition 4.10. Also:
TB  [Sat(〈〉, sb(x, y)) ↔ Sat(x, y)]tr ↔ (Tsb(〈〉, sb(x, y)) ↔ Tsb(x, y))
↔ (Tsb(x, y) ↔ Tsb(x, y)). 
Therefore, we have our first, simple-minded example of t-equivalent theories of truth.
PROPOSITION 4.12.
(i) TBS∗ is a t-retract of TB;
(ii) TB and TBS∗ are t-equivalent.
Proof. In TBS, Satst◦tr(x, y) is provably equivalent to Sat(〈〉, sb(x, y)). In TBS∗ we
can then conclude Sat(x, y). 
The role of D becomes even more prominent if we consider a suitably simplified form
of uniform, disquotational satisfaction. UTB has already been introduced on page 18.
DEFINITION 4.13. UTBS extends EAT with all instances of the schema
∀x (Sat(〈x〉, ϕ(v)) ↔ ϕ(x)) (utbs)
for all L-formulas ϕ with the displayed variables free. Similarly as before, we let
UTBS∗ := UTBS + D.
By adapting the reasoning employed for TB and TBS, and by (14) above, we can conclude:
LEMMA 4.14.
(i) UTBS∗ and UTB are mutually truth-definable.
(ii) UTBS∗ and UTB are t-equivalent.
I now consider the case of full Tarskian truth and satisfaction over EA. In EA there
are the following elementary formulas expressing the corresponding elementary syntactic
notions:
map(x) :⇔ ‘x is a finite mapping’
dom(x, y) :⇔ ‘y is an element of the domain of the finite mapping x’
ass(x, y) :⇔ ‘y is a formula and x is a finite mapping whose domain
contains precisely the free variables of y’
x ⊇ y :⇔ ‘x and y are assignments and dom(x) contains dom(y)’
DEFINITION 4.15. The theory CS in LSat is obtained by extending EA formulated in
LSat—that is, in which Sat can appear into instances of induction—with the universal
closures of the following:
ass(x, R(v1, . . . , vn)) ∧
( n∧
i=1
x(vi) = xi
) → (Sat(x, R(v1, . . . , vn)) ↔ R(x1, . . . , xn))
(S1)
ass(x, y) → (Sat(x,ng(y)) ↔ ¬Sat(x, y)) (S2)
ass(x, and(y, z)) → (Sat(x, and(y, z)) ↔ (Sat(x, y) ∧ Sat(x, z))) (S3)
ass(x, all(v, y)) → (Sat(x,all(v, y)) ↔ (∀z ⊇ x) Sat(z, y)) (S4)
Sat(x, y) → ass(x, y). (S5)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020316000435
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. King's College London, on 26 Jul 2019 at 08:47:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
EQUIVALENCES FOR TRUTH PREDICATES 343
We recall that CT is the theory obtained from CT from Definition 4.8 by allowing formulas
of LT, in which the truth predicate only applies to formulas of L, into the schema of
0-induction. As one might expect, st and tr give us
LEMMA 4.16.
(i) CT defines the truth predicate of CS;
(ii) CS defines the truth predicate of CT.
Proof. (i) crucially employs the properties of substitution. For instance, for S1,
we reason as follows, with the contextual information that ass(x, R(v1, . . . , vn)) and∧n
i=1 x(vi) = xi :
Tsb(x, R(v1, . . . , vn)) ↔ TR(x˙1, . . . , x˙n) by sb and EA
↔ R(x1, . . . , xn) by Tat
For (S4), we notice that EA proves
all(v, sub(x, y)) = sb(x, all(v, y)). (16)
Now if Tsb(x, all(v, y)), also Tall(v, sb(x, y)) and therefore ∀w Tsub(sb(x, y), w¯)
by the CT axioms. If there is a mapping z ⊇ x such that ¬Tsb(z, y), also ass(z, y)
and ass(x, all(v, y)). Therefore, there is a w0 such that ¬ dom(x, w0) and dom(z, w0).
Hence, in EA,
sub(sb(x, y), w¯0) = sb(z, y) (17)
We can then conclude Tsb(z, y), contradicting our assumption. The converse direction is
obtained similarly, with the help of (16) and (17).
(ii) is obtained once we have established a version of D above via suitable induction on
the formal complexity of the ‘formula’ y:
ass(x, y) → (Sat(x, y) ↔ Sat(〈〉, sb(x, y))) (18)

PROPOSITION 4.17. CT and CS are truth equivalent.
Proof. That CT is a retract of CS is immediate by definitions of st and tr. To conclude
that CS is a retract of CT, we only need (18). In both cases the required isomorphisms are
in fact identities. 
We notice that, unlike the previous observations concerning disquotation, Proposition
4.17 still holds when we formulate CS in a language without domain constants. Moreover,
since we essentially employ the extended induction of CS to obtain the t-equivalence of the
two theories, it would be interesting to know what happens if we consider induction free
versions of the theories involved. The question of whether CS and CT are t-equivalent
(or mutually truth-definable) is in fact still open.
In desideratum (III) above, we required the notions of t-retracts and t-equivalence to be
nonempty. Although not exciting, the examples just presented suffice to accomplish this
minimal task. Admittedly, the main role of our proposed sufficient condition for concep-
tual equivalence is to discourage inadequate claims, and this is mostly accomplished by
negative results such as Corollary 4.7.
I now move to an example of bi-interpretability simpliciter between truth theories that
originates in Leigh & Nicolai (2013), in which theories with external truth were first
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introduced.30 Here I only sketch a simplified construction that may be useful to obtain
more sophisticated—and more natural—examples. Let EA2 be obtained by ‘cloning’ the
language L in a ‘two-sorted’ version: in practice, I work with relativizing predicates s(x)
and t(x) that represent the two copies of our numbers. I abbreviate ∀x(s(x) → ϕ(x)) with
(∀x : s) ϕ(x), and similarly for t. The language of EA2 will thus contain, for instance, two
versions of the primitive predicate ‘. . . is zero’, Zs and Zt, and so on for the other primitive
notions, including identity symbols =s,=t . The induction axioms of EA2 come therefore
in two flavours, one in which the relevant variable can only belong to s and one in which
it can only belong to t, although formulas from the entire language are allowed in both
types of instances. We assume the usual arithmetization of the syntax for EA2 carried out
in the s-portion of the language. We also include in the theory a ‘Frege relation’ F, that is
a relation witnessing an isomorphism between the two domains corresponding to the two
sorts. In other words we add axioms of the form:
xFy → s(x) ∧ t(y) (F0)
‘F is a bijection between s-objects and t-objects’ (F1)
(∀x : s)(∀y : t)(x F y → ( Zs(x) ↔ Zt(y))) (F2)
(∀x, u : s)(∀y, v : t)(x F y ∧ u F v → (Ss(x, u) ↔ St(y, v))) (F3)
By formal induction in EA2, the analogues of F2 and F3 for the predicates A and M for
addition, multiplication and exponentiation come out as theorems of EA2:
(∀x, y, z : s)(∀u, v, w : t)(x F u ∧ y F v ∧ z Fw → (As(x, y, z) ↔ At(u, v, w)) (19)
(∀x, y, z : s)(∀u, v, w : t)(x F u ∧ y F v ∧ z Fw → (Ms(x, y, z) ↔ Mt(u, v, w)) (20)
(∀x, y : s)(∀u, v : t)(x F u ∧ y F v → (Es(x, y) ↔ Et(u, v))). (21)
I then introduce typed truth axioms for EA2 by employing a truth predicate Tr of type
s, that is, applying only to objects of sort s. The characterizing truth axioms, besides
the obvious analogues of T2 and () (cf. p. 18), are the ones for atomic formulas and
quantifiers:
Tr Rs(x˙1, . . . , x˙n) ↔ Rt
(
F(x1), . . . ,F(xn))
)
for all s- and t-relation symbols (Tat*)
Fml1Ls(y) →
(
Tr (alls(v, y)) ↔ (∀z : s)
(
Tr subs(y, z)
))
. (Tq)
I refer to the resulting theory of truth as T[EA2]. The theory CT has been already intro-
duced: it is convenient to think of the current version of CT as built over a one-sorted
language of sort s, a sublanguage of the language of EA2.
PROPOSITION 4.18. T[EA2] and CT are bi-interpretable.
30 Although already at that time the influential work of Richard Heck, who should be granted the
priority, together with Albert Visser, of introducing external truth, was widely circulating. This
approach can be motivated in the following way: If one starts with an arbitrary object theory U ,
unlike what it is commonly thought, it is not so straighforward to introduce a notion of truth
for U . If, for instance, U fails to be sequential (cf. §1), the theory does not have a good notion
of sequence and we won’t have the necessary resources to express full satisfaction in a direct or
derivative form—e.g., by employing domain constants as in the case of a unary truth predicate.
However, truth and sequences can be added ‘from the outside’ (Leigh & Nicolai, 2013; Heck,
2015; Nicolai, 2016a).
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Proof. I specify the interpretation K : T[EA2] → CT. The idea behind it is entirely
straightforward: the two copies of the numbers in T[EA2] are reproduced in CT as pairs
with 0 and 1 as first members, whereas primitive relations collapse into their counterparts
in CT. In CT we find the following elementary formulas:
pair(x) :↔ ‘x is an ordered pair’
pri(x) :↔ ‘x is an ordered pair with first member i’
πi (x, y) :↔ ‘y is the i th projection of the pair x’
I employ πi (·) in a functional form. Let
tK(x) :↔ x : pr0 sK(x) :↔ x : pr1
ZKt (x) :↔ Z(π1(x)) ZKs (x) :↔ Z(π1(x))
...
...
TrKx :↔ Tπ1(x) FK(x, y) :↔ x : pr1 ∧ y : pr0 ∧ π1(x) = π1(y)
x =s y :↔ x, y : pr1 ∧ π1(x) = π1(y) x =t y :↔ x, y : pr0 ∧ π1(x) = π1(y)
K relativizes quantifiers to pair(x). The vertical dots refer to the clauses for the
other arithmetical relations (in both versions), and the convention employed in
the definition of EA2 concerning relativized quantifiers has been extended to pr0
and pr1.
The interpretation L : CT → T[EA2] simply relativizes everything to the predicate s.
Crucially:
(∀xϕ)L :↔ (∀x : s)ϕL
TL(x) :↔ Tr(x)
By letting, in T[EA2],
G(x, y) :↔ (pr1s(x) ∧ πs1 (x) = y) ∨ (pr0s(x) ∧ F(πs1 (x)) = y),
it is not difficult to check that G : L ◦ K ∼= idT[EA2] and π1 : K ◦ L ∼= idCT, witnessing the
required bi-interpretability of T[EA2] and CT. 
We conclude this section by with a chart summarizing our findings.
DESIDERATUM EXAMPLES
Extensions of mutual truth-definability t-retracts, t-equivalence
Separating t-retracts, t-equivalence,
mutual truth-definability PUTB, KF; PUTB, KF
Non-emptiness of t-retracts, t-equivalence Flavours of Truth and Satisfaction
Bi-interpretability simpliciter ‘External’ truth
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§5. Extending the framework: syntactical embeddings, e-retractions, e-equivalence.
As anticipated in the initial section, natural generalizations of the notions of t-retract and
t-equivalence may yield new insights on the comparison between the operations of adding
typed truth and predicative comprehension to a ground syntactic structure. Nicolai (2016b)
focuses on abstracting away restrictive choices of the object theory. I now consider a less
general framework but stricter notions of reduction. In particular, claims like the following
belong to the truth-theoretic and foundational folklore:
Typing truth predicates corresponds to a much more severe move in the
case of comprehension: typing corresponds to predicative typed com-
prehension [...] Actually ramified type theory over Peano arithmetic as
base theory, which is known as ramified analysis, is equivalent to typed
compositional truth. (Halbach, 2014, p. 28)
In what sense should this ‘equivalence’ be understood? Most likely Halbach refers to
proof-theoretical equivalence (cf. Feferman (1988)), which in the cases I consider below
is no different from a more liberal notion of truth-definition. In this section I employ
analogues of the notions of truth-definitions, t-retractions and t-equivalence to refine these
folklore statements. Several observations contained in this section rely on unpublished
work of Ali Enayat and Albert Visser.
I first generalize the notion of a truth-definition to arbitrary nonlogical vocabulary
extending the language of a suitable syntax theory B.
DEFINITION 5.1 (Syntactical embedding). Let LB ⊆ LT ,LW and B ⊆ T, W . We say
that T is syntactically embeddable in W if and only if there is a relative interpretation
K : T → W that leaves the primitive vocabulary of LB unchanged and does not (non-
trivially) relativize its quantifiers.
Truth-definitions as defined above are clearly examples of syntactical embeddings. We now
move to generalizations of the notions of t-retract and t-equivalence.
DEFINITION 5.2 (e-retract, e-equivalence). Let T, W ⊇ B be given.
(i) T is an e-retract of W if there are syntactical embeddings K : T → W and
L : W → T and a T -definable F : L ◦ K ∼= idT ;
(ii) T and W are e-equivalent if there are syntactical embeddings K : T → W and
L : W → T , a T -definable F : L ◦ K ∼= idT and a W -definable
G : K ◦ L ∼= idW .
To be able to apply the new notions, I briefly recall some standard definitions concerning
subsystems of second-order arithmetic as they can be found, for instance, in Simpson
(2009). L2 is the two-sorted language extending L with a sort for sets of natural numbers,
or ‘reals’. The two kinds of variables will often be denoted by x, y, z, . . . and X, Y, Z . . .
respectively, possibly with indices. In practice, to conform with our notions of reduction, it
is convenient to consider the two-sorted language as notational abbreviation for a language
with suitable relativizing predicates. That is, we officially work in a single-sorted language
with relativizing predicates se(x), ‘x is a set’, and nu(x), ‘x is a number’, and a primitive
membership predicate ∈. A formula of L2 is said to be arithmetical if it contains no set
quantifiers but possibly set parameters. The so-called arithmetical comprehension schema
has the form
∃X ∀x (x ∈ X ↔ ϕ(x, u, Y )), (aca)
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where ϕ(v0) is arithmetical and does not contain X .31 The theory ACA in L2 is obtained
by relativizing the basic axioms of EA to the ‘numbers’ sort and by extending it with (aca)
and an induction schema for arbitrary L2-formulas. ACApf in L2 is obtained from ACA by
disallowing set-parameters into instances of the comprehension schema. The theory ACA0
is obtained from ACA by replacing its full induction schema with the equivalent, in the
official language, of the single sentence
(0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x (x ∈ X → Sx ∈ X)) → ∀x x ∈ X. IND
In the official presentation of the theories by means of relativizing predicates, I also require
the domain to be partitioned by them.
For the purpose of this section I will consider only finite iterations of full predicative
comprehension obtained intuitively by iterating ACA n-times. The restriction to finite
levels is motivated by the difficulties in the formulation of iterations of predicative com-
prehension for higher ordinals. In particular, ramified analysis is classically formulated by
employing reflection principles (see Feferman (1964)), and this creates some difficulties in
transferring the results below to the transfinite.
More formally, we have
L<0 := L
L<n+1 := L ∪ {sei ,∈i } for i ≤ n
I will also write Ln for L<n+1. RA0 is ACA itself. The degree of a formula of Ln is the
maximum of the k + 1 such that sek(y) appears in the formula with y bound and of the m
such that sem(z) appears in the formula with z is free (of course with m ≤ n and k < n).
I write ϕn for a formula of at most degree n. Then RAn+1 results from RAn by extending
its induction schema to the new language and by adding to it the axioms:
x ∈n+1 y → sen+1(y) (22)
∃y (sen+1(y) ∧ ∀x(x ∈n+1 y ↔ ϕn+1(x, u, Xi ))). (23)
For reasons of readability, we have omitted the relativization nu(x). We will keep this
convention in what follows. In (23), y is not free in ϕ and Xi is a string of parameters from
elements of sei for i ≤ n + 1. By disallowing (set-)parameters into the schema (23), one
obtains a parallel hierarchy of finitely iterated (parameter-free) predicative comprehension,
with RApf0 := ACApf.
We are interested in associating the theories just presented with finite iterations of
UTB[PA] and CT[PA]. The latter theories are formulated in the languages LnT :=
L ∪ {T0, . . . ,Tn} for n ∈ ω, with L<0T := L and L<n+1T := LnT.
DEFINITION 5.3. Let RT0 := CT[PA] and RDT0 := UTB[PA], both formulated in L0T.
• The theory RDTn+1 is obtained by extending RDTn with full Ln+1T -induction and
all instances of
∀x (Tn+1ϕ(x˙) ↔ ϕ(x))
for all Ln-formulas ϕ(v).
31 In our official formulation, the arithmetical comprehension thus becomes
se(z) → ∃y(se(y) ∧ ∀u(nu(u) → (u ∈ y ↔ ϕ(u, v, z)))).
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• The theory RTn+1 contains the axioms of RTn, including the induction schema for
the entire language Ln+1T , and the following, for m < n + 1:
∀x1, . . . , xn
(
Tn+1R(x˙1, . . . , x˙n) ↔ R(x1, . . . , xn)
) (R1n+1)
∀x (SentL<mT (x) → (Tn+1Tm x˙ ↔ Tm x)) (R2n+1)
∀x (SentLnT(x) → (Tn+1ng(x) ↔ ¬Tn+1x)) (R3n+1)
∀x, y (SentLnT(and(x, y)) → (Tn+1and(x, y) ↔ (Tn+1x ∧ Tn+1 y))) (R4n+1)
∀x, v (SentLnT(all(v, x)) → (Tn+1all(v, x) ↔ ∀y Tn+1sub(x, y))) (R5n+1)
∀y ≤ n ∀x (SentL<y˙T (x) → (Tn+1Ty˙ x˙ ↔ Tn+1 x)). (R6n+1)
The standard reductions between ramified truth and predicative comprehension mainly
amount to mutual syntactical embeddings (cf. Halbach (2014); Feferman (1991); Takeuti
(1987); Fischer (2009)): Let T0(X0, u) be the L0-formula
∀y (y ∈ X0 ↔ SentL(y) ∧ lc(x) ≤ u ∧
∀x (y = R( ˙x) → (y ∈ X0 ↔ Rx))
∀z (y = ng(z) → (y ∈ X0 ↔ z /∈ X0)) ∧
∀w, z (y = and(w, z) → (y ∈ X0 ↔ (w ∈ X0 ∧ z ∈ X0))) ∧
∀v, z, y (x = all(v, z) → (x ∈ X0 ↔ ∀y (sub(z, y) ∈ X0)))).
Moreover, let V0(x) :↔ (∃Y 0)(T0(Y 0, lc(x)) ∧ x ∈ Y 0). This latter formula plays the
role of a partial truth predicate for L-formulas of complexity up to (and including) the
complexity of x . To define what it means to be a partial truth set of level n+1, we generalize
the notion of logical complexity of a formula to sentences of LnT by letting lcn+1(Tn y˙)
to be 0 and keeping the rest as it is:
Tn+1(Xn+1, u) :↔ ∀y
(
y ∈ Xn+1 ↔ SentLnT(y) ∧ lcn+1(y) ≤ u ∧
∀x (y = R( ˙x) → (y ∈ Xn+1 ↔ Rx)) ∧
∀z (y = ng(z) → (y ∈ Xn+1 ↔ z /∈ Xn+1)) ∧
∀w, z (y = and(w, z) → (y ∈ Xn+1 ↔ (w ∈ Xn+1 ∧ z ∈ Xn+1))) ∧
∀v, z, y (x = all(v, z) → (x ∈ Xn+1 ↔ ∀y (sub(z, y) ∈ Xn+1))) ∧
∀z (SentL<nT (z) ∧ y = Tn z˙ → (y ∈ Xn+1 ↔ Vn(z))) ∧
∀u ≤ n ∀z (SentL<u˙T (z) ∧ y = Tu˙ z˙ → (y ∈ X
n+1 ↔ z ∈ Xn+1))).
The formula Vn+1(x) is then defined in the obvious way.
We finally adapt the folklore translations to our setting by defining the translation func-
tions Kn : LnT → Ln , Ln : Ln → LnT in Table 1. We remark that Ln and LnT feature only
one identity symbol.
In the table, the elementary formula sub1(x, y) = z expresses the result of formally
replacing the single free variable of a formula y with x . The folkore reductions can be
summarized as follows.
PROPOSITION 5.4.
(i) For each n ∈ ω, RDTn and RApfn are mutually syntactically embeddable.
(ii) For each n ∈ ω, RTn and RAn are mutually syntactically embeddable.
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Table 1. The translations Kn, Ln
RKn (x) :↔ Rx RLn (x) :↔ Rx for R ∈ L
x =Kn y :↔ x = y x =Ln y :↔ x = y
TKnm x :↔ Vm(x) x(∈m)Ln y :↔ Tmsub1(x, y) with m ≤ n
(¬ϕ)Kn :↔ ¬ϕKn (¬ϕ)Ln :↔ ¬ϕLn
(ϕ ∧ ψ)Kn :↔ ϕKn ∧ ψKn (ϕ ∧ ψ)Ln :↔ ϕLn ∧ ψLn
(∀xϕ)Kn :↔ (∀x : nu) ϕKn (∀xϕ)Ln :↔ ∀x ϕLn
nuLn (x) :↔ x = x
(sem)Ln (x) :↔ Fml1L<m (x) m ≤ n
Proof. One can check that Kn and Ln are the required syntactical embeddings, given the
following facts:
RApfn  ∃Xm Tm(Xm, k) for m ≤ n and k ∈ ω (24)
RAn  ∀x ∃Xn Tn(Xn, x) (25)
if ϕ(v) is in Lm , then ϕLm (v) belongs to LmT (26)
RTn  ∀u, z (TmϕLn(u˙, ˙z) ↔ ϕLn(u, z)) for m ≤ n, ϕ in L<m , and se<m(z) (27)

From the previous chapter we know that e-retractions and e-equivalences properly
strengthen mutual syntactical embeddings. It is thus interesting to investigate whether
the folklore mutual embeddings between typed truth and comprehension can be lifted to
stricter notions of equivalence. The following shows that the folklore translations partially
suffice.
PROPOSITION 5.5. For each n ∈ ω, RTn is an e-retract of RAn.
Proof. The case n = 0 follows from the fact that in CT[PA] we have partial truth
predicates Trn(·) of complexity n for n-formulas and for each n. (Hájek & Pudlák,
1998, I.(d)). By its extended induction, we can prove in CT[PA] that
TL0◦K0(x) ↔ ∃y T0Try˙ (x˙) ↔ T0x . (28)
We emphasize that in (28) the truth predicate T0 enables us to quantify over the index of
the partial truth predicate. The required isomorphism is thus the identity on RT0.
The same idea can be extended to the languages Ln , by focusing now on the hierarchy
of Tnm -formulas, and constructing in the standard way partial truth predicates TrTnv (x) for
the languages LnT; they should be thought as formalizing the stages of the construction of
Tn+1 from previsouly defined truth predicates. In particular, all LnT-sentences ϕ deemed
true at previous stages are such that Tn+1TrTn0˙
(ϕ) is provable in RTn+1.
Again by full Ln+1T -induction:
RTn+1  TLn+1◦Kn+1(x) ↔ ∃y Tn+1TrTny˙ (x˙) ↔ Tn+1(x). (29)
As before, the required isomorphism is indeed the identity function on RTn+1. 
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But Proposition 5.5 is in a sense the best we can do. I adapt to the present setting an
unpublished argument by Enayat and Visser and show that ramified analysis, both in full
or parameter-free form, cannot be a retract of ramified truth, both in full compositional or
uniform disquotational form.32
PROPOSITION 5.6.
(i) RApfn is not a retract nor an e-retract of RDTn[PA], for n ∈ ω.
(ii) RAn is not a retract nor an e-retract of RTn[PA].
Proof. I give the argument for 5.6(i) the same reasoning applies to 5.6(ii). If RApfn were
a retract of RDTn , any model (M0,R0, . . . ,Rn) of RApfn —where the Ri ’s are subsets of
M0—could define an internal model (M1,S0, . . . ,Sn)  RDTn ofM0 that would in turn
define within itself an internal model (M2, T0, . . . , Tn)  RApfn of M1 such that M0 is
isomorphic to M2, definably in M0 (cf. Figure 1, §3).
Let us now start with the ‘standard’ model of RApfn , i.e., the tuple (ω, P(ω)). By the
above considerations, we have the situation depicted in Figure 2, where (M1, S)  RDTn
and (M2, T )  RApfn —obviously the Si are subsets of SentL<nT and the Ti ’s subsets
of M2. Since (M2, T ) ∼= (ω, P(ω)), there is an interpretation of (ω,P(ω)) in (M1,S).
Thus (M1,S) defines its standard natural numbers. At the same time, since (M1, S)
satisfies induction with the truth predicate and it interprets the basic axioms of EA, by
Lemma 2.2 one can (M1, S)-define an injection f : M1 → ω by primitive recursion.
Therefore M1 is countable, and thus it cannot define the uncountable structure
(ω, P(ω)). 
COROLLARY 5.7.
(i) For each n ∈ ω, RApfn and RDTn are not e-equivalent nor bi-interpretable;
(ii) For each n ∈ ω, RAn and RTn are not e-equivalent nor bi-interpretable;
COROLLARY 5.8. The relations ‘being an e-retract of’ and e-equivalence are properly
stricter than mutual syntactical embeddability.
(ω, P(ω))
(M1, S)
(M2, T ) ∼= (ω, P(ω))
Fig. 2. Models in the proof of Proposition 5.6(i).
32 Note that the argument is so general that can be applied also to the transfinite, once a suitable
formulation of ramified analysis is given. I thank Albert Visser for giving me the permission of
quoting his unpublished work.
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Corollary 5.7 is already worth consideration. It denies the possibility of strong forms
of equivalence between predicative comprehension and typed truth. Typed compositional
truth predicates seem to be ‘stronger’, in the precise sense described above, than the
corresponding set-theoretic axioms. This gives us already a refinement of the folklore claim
of the correspondence between typed truth and predicative comprehension, at least in the
case of full compositional truth. A natural question therefore is to investigate the nature of
this asymmetry by measuring what exactly one has to add to ramified analysis to recapture
the corresponding truth predicates in the sense of e-equivalence. To do this, at least in the
case of RAn and RTn , I again elaborate on an idea by Enayat and Visser.
I move to definitional extensions of the RAn’s obtained by adding identity predicates
=m , for m ≤ n, satisfying
y =m z ↔ ∀u(u ∈m y ↔ u ∈m z) (30)
y =m z → sem(y) ∧ sem(z). (31)
For simplicity, I again employ RAn and RApfn as names of the extended theories.
Also I keep Km from Table 1 fixed. In RTn , for m ≤ n, I define
x ∼m y :↔ Fml1L<mT (x) ∧ Fml
1
L<mT (y) ∧ ∀u (Tmsub
1(u, x) ↔ Tmsub1(u, y)) (32)
(32) simply says that the L<mT -formulas x, y are satisfied by the same objects. The trans-
lation Mm is obtained from Lm in Table 1 by introducing clauses for =m as follows, with
k ≤ m:
x =Mmk y :↔ x ∼k y. (33)
Mn determines a syntactical embedding of RAn and RApf in RAn and RDTn respectively.
Moreover, the argument in Proposition 5.5 proceeds unchanged if Mn is employed instead
of Ln . Let
Dm :↔
m∧
i=0
∀x
(
sei (x) → ∃y (FmlL<iT (y) ∧ ∀u(u ∈i x ↔ Vi (sub1(u, y))))
)
.
The sentence Dn says that for all i ≤ n, every set of level i can be defined by a L<iT -
formula: by ‘define’ here I mean that its elements can be shown to be exactly the elements
satisfying this formula. By reflecting on the proof of Proposition 5.6, one can immediately
see how the addition of Dn excludes what we called the ‘standard model of RAn’ from
the space of the models of RAn + Dn . Moreover, Dn forces the L<iT -formula defining a set
Xi to be unique up to ∼Kii -equivalence. By employing essentially the same reasoning as in
Proposition 5.5, we have
LEMMA 5.9. For each n ∈ ω,
(i) Mn is a syntactical embedding of RAn + Dn in RTn ;
(ii) RTn is an e-retract of RAn + Dn.
Finally we can check that the sentences Dn suffice to restore the symmetry between the
two hierarchies:
PROPOSITION 5.10. RAn + Dn is an e-retract of RAn.
Proof. We know that RAn + Dn and RTn are mutually syntactically embeddable via Kn
and Mn. The induction schema of RAn + Dn enables one to prove, for all m ≤ n (and for
all n ∈ ω),
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∀y
(
FmlL<mT (y) → (∃Xm)(∀u)(u ∈m Xm ↔ Vm(sb(u, y)))
)
. (34)
Next I let
Hn(x, y) :↔
n∨
i=0
(FmlL<iT (x) ∧ se
i (y) ∧ (∀u)(u ∈i y ↔ Vi (sub1(u, x)))) ∨ (35)
(¬Fml1L<nT (x) ∧ y = x).
It remains to verify, in RAn+Dn, that Hn(x, y) is the required isomorphism from Km ◦ Mm
to idRAn+Dn , that is, that conditions (2)–(9) on page 9 are satisfied by Hn . Dn , in combi-
nation with (34), give us the totality conditions for H. I now verify that =i and (∈i )Kn◦Mn
behave as expected for i ≤ n. This will complete the proof.
We first notice that Hn(x, y) is ‘functional’, that is, for m ≤ n:
Hm(x, y) ∧ Hm(x, z) → y =Km◦Mmm z (36)
Hm(x, y) ∧ Hm(z, y) → x =m z. (37)
Assuming Hi (u, w) and Hi (x, y) with FmlL<iT (x), I first show that
RAn + Dn  Hi (u, w) ∧ Hi (x, y) →
(
u =Kn◦Mni x ↔ w =i y).
We can safely assume that x, u are L<iT -formulas. We have
u =Kn◦Mni x ↔ u ∼Kni x
↔ ∀v(Vi (sub1(v, u)) ↔ Vi (sub1(v, x)))
↔ ∀v(v ∈i w ↔ v ∈i y)
↔ w =i y
The penultimate line is obtained by definition of Hi . For ∈i I show
RAn + Dn  Hi (u, w) ∧ Hi (x, y) →
(
u(∈i )Kn◦Mn x ↔ w ∈i y)
Assuming that Hi (u, w) and Hi (x, y) we have, with FmlL<iT (x) and nu(u):
u(∈i )Kn◦Mn x ↔ TKni (sb(u, x))
↔ Vi (sb(u, x))
↔ u ∈i y
↔ w ∈i y.
In the last line we have again employed the properties of Hi . 
COROLLARY 5.11. RAn + Dn and RTn are e-equivalent.
Finding principles that render iterated uniform disquotation equivalent to ramifications
of parameter free comprehension is, as one might expect, more difficult. At least if one
wants resort to principles that represent meaningful restrictions such as the Dn’s above. For
instance, already to achieve an analogue of Proposition 5.5 by using the same translations,
we would require RDTn to be able to prove a principle like (29). Although RDTn has full
induction, however, there seems to be no way to mimic the crucial role that compositional
axioms have in its proof in RTn . Of course we can add what we lack to RDTn .
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Let
En :↔
n∧
i=0
∀x (Ti x ↔ (∃y : FmlL<iT )(T
Mn
i (y, lc
i (x)) ∧ Tisb1(y, x))).
It is somewhat tedious, although straightforward by En , to verify that, for n ∈ ω,
LEMMA 5.12. RDTn + En  EMn◦Kn .
Therefore RDTn + En and RApfn + EKnn are mutually syntactically embeddable. With
Lemma 5.12 at hand, we can conclude:
PROPOSITION 5.13. RDTn + En is a retract of RApfn + EKnn .
By adding new principles to the theories in Proposition 5.13, we might even be able to
prove the e-equivalence of extensions of RDTn + En and RApfn + EKnn , although the more
we add, the more the theories will look convoluted and hardly justifiable.
§6. Conclusion. I have argued that mutual truth-definability, let alone mutual inter-
pretability, is not adequate as sufficient condition for two theories of truth to embody the
same conception of truth as defined in §1 and §2. The most prominent example of this
failure is represented by case of the well-known principles of truth corresponding to the
theories KF and PUTB, that are mutually truth-definable and still do not share most of
the distinctive features described in §2. An alternative is the notion of t-equivalence: what
I called Thesis 1 claims that it is a sufficient condition for the conceptual equivalence
of the notions of truth arising from t-equivalent theories. To support the plausibility of
this thesis, already suggested by the relationships between t-equivalence and synonymy
given by Friedman and Visser’s theorem, I have shown that it captures the manifest non-
equivalence of the notions of truth of KF and PUTB—as the theories turn out to be not
t-equivalent—and that some intuitively very close notions of truth, such as variations of
Tarksian truth and satisfaction in the presence of full induction, result in fact in t-equivalent
theories. T-retracts and t-equivalence, therefore, have been devised to be in continuity and
extend mutual truth-definability, but if one loosens the criteria on the interpretation of the
base-theoretic language, interesting combinations may arise. I have also provided in §4.2 a
simple-minded template for generating theories of truth that are bi-interpretable but cannot
be t-equivalent.
Mutual truth-definability is a particular case of a mutual syntactical embedding. By
following the same strategy adopted to define t-retracts and t-equivalence, one can define
the more general notions of e-retract and e-equivalence. These notions have proved to be
useful to refine the folklore claims that link iterations of ramified truth and iterations of
arithmetical comprehension. By crucially employing recent insights due Albert Visser and
Ali Enayat, I have verified that finite iterations of ramified truth are not e-equivalent to
finite iterations of arithmetical comprehension; this also shows that the notions of e-retract
and e-equivalence are properly stricter than mutual syntactical embeddability. Since typed
(disquotational or compositional) truth is an e-retract of finite iterations of arithmetical
comprehension, the philosopher interested in deflating the ontological assumptions on the
existence of subsets of N may welcome this phenomenon as a confirmation of this possi-
bility. At the same time, the failure of the t-equivalence between the two hierarchies should
suggest that, from the logical point of view, typed truth and membership to (a portion
of the) predicatively definable sets are not notational variants of each other.
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Obviously these are only small, initial steps into the application to theories of truth and
subsystems of analysis of the categories of theories and interpretations studied in Visser
(2006) and there are a number of unresolved issues. We list a few. In the first place one
may consider more examples of natural theories of truth that are mutually truth-definable
and investigate their t-equivalence; a natural starting point is, for instance, to consider the
hierarchy RTn for n ∈ ω and the corresponding (in the sense of mutual truth-definability)
ω-consistent subsets of FS. A second example, related to bi-interpretability simpliciter,
concerns theories of truth with the same truth theoretic axioms but built on bi-interpretable
base theories: the question is then whether they are uniformly bi-interpretable both in the
typed and in the type-free case. In comparing truth axioms and arithmetical comprehension,
even more variations are possible: one question is to consider theories with restricted
induction (both in the truth-theoretic and the second-order side) that escape Proposition
5.6 and investigate whether they are e-retracts of each other and/or whether they are e-
equivalent. Moreover, it is natural to wonder whether it is possible to lift the observations
in §5 to transfinite iterations.
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